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Abstract
Previous empirical studies of school choice have been at the national level, or have
focussed on northeastern states. We estimate the demand for private education in rural Georgia,
using proportion of private school attendance as an indicator variable. We find that income, tuition,
race and school quality are important choice determmants. The results provide useful information
for rural school administrators, and suggest that a tuition tax credit would have to be substantial to
cause a significant exodus from public schools.
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A large part of the debate on school choice
and educational financing has revolved around the
effect of public policies on parents’ choice of
private versus public schools for their children.
This choice has important implications for school
financing and school quality, as well as broader
implications for the nature of economic and social
opportunity. Proposals to offer vouchers or tuition
tax credits for private education have been
particularly prominent.] Theoretical and empirical
research has shown that the decision to attend
private schools is complex, and depends on social
and cultural factors, parents’ perceptions of school
quality, and the relative prices of private and public
education (Lankford and Wyckoffi Hamilton and
Macauley). Empirical research has been performed
at various levels of aggregation, but to date
disaggregated research has focussed on the school
choice in the northeast in predominantly urban
areas. The purpose of this analysis is to extend this
empirical research to school choice in the rural
south - in particular to school choice in rural
Georgia.
The history of conflict over public
education and the rapid growth of private schools in
the region after school integration suggest that
parental reaction to key variables may differ from
those observed in the urban, northeastern, and
nation-wide investigations in the literature. This
paper focuses on the demand for private education
as a finction of key characteristics of both the
public and private alternatives. The implications of
this research for education administration and
financing, given the current debate about widening
school choice through interventions such as
vouchers and tax credits, are no less important for
rural areas than for urban ones.
Another motivation for this research is to
gain insight into why parents remove their children
from the public school system. Public education
administrators in the rural South are concerned
about losing students to private schools. They
realize that the loss of students entails both the loss
of financial support and parental support for school
functions (Flowers). Information about how parents
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respond to public school characteristics will answer
the question of whether administrators can improve
the public’s perception of the schools and thus
increase the likelihood that parents will choose
public schools.
Much of the theoretical research on this
topic has focused on the ways that taxpayerlvoter
preferences about school finance map into choices
about educational expenditure and quality.
Expenditure on education has been used as a proxy
for school quality (Stiglitz); he hypothesized that
private schools are better than public schools
because per-pupil expenditure is higher. Flowers
focused on the relationship of private and public
school quality - lowering the cost of private
education decreases the number of children in the
public schools, but also decreases the willingness of
the average resident to fund public education. She
found that while a tax credit would tend to increase
enrollment in private schools, it could conceivably
increase the quality of public education. This would
happen if the marginal cost of educational quality
increased with the number of students enrolled
while the tax credit decreased enrollment. Although
higher expenditures cause higher educational quality
in Flowers’ work, she recognized that private and
public education had different cost functions.
Given this emphasis on the relationship of
cost differences and school choice in the literature,
the actual behavior of parents when confronted with
differing circumstances is an essential input for
public debate. We have found four empirical
studies on this topic.2 These are summarized in
table 1, with the variables used and the estimates of
demand elasticities. Frey (1983) performed a
national analysis, with states as the units of
observation. Using six independent variables, he
found that all variables had their hypothesized signs
and estimated the price elasticity of demand to be
between -0.4 and -2.1. Frey’s work is based on
statewide data with the explanatory variables
associated with private schools averaged to obtain
state-level data; thus, his work is unavoidably
limited to highly aggregated variables and thus loses
some of the flavor of local choice. West and
Palsson also estimated a model with state-level
variables. Using eight independent variables, they
estimated the price elasticity to be from -1.5 to -3.0.
Hamilton and Macauley used school
district-level data from New Jersey and applied the
log transformation to the dependent variable, so it is
not bounded at zero. They did not use a price
variable in their study because they selected
homogeneous school districts where the variance of
private tuition was very low. They focussed special
attention on the standard deviation of household
income because, they argued, the variable is a proxy
for the effect of student peer groups on
achievement. Lankford and Wyckoff applied a logit
analysis to a unique data set for 28,000 individual
students in New York State. As summarized in
table 1, the decision to attend a religious school was
modeled as a function of income and tuition, plus
five school characteristics, five environmental
factors, and five demographic indicators.
Frey (199 I) and Martinello and West
introduce two important considerations for this
anal ysis. First, a tuition tax credit might be
expected to increase the tuition charged by private
schools in situations where the supply of private
education is not perfectly elastic. Second, a tax
credit of the magnitude offered in policy proposals
might be of such large magnitude that it might
cause out-of- sample changes in private school
enrollment.
Our paper most closely follows Hamilton
and Macauley in explaining parental choice as a
function of key characteristics without explicitly
equating cost with quality. We also utilize a school
district-level analysis that has substantial variation
in both enrollment and in the explanatory variables,
providing a wider range of latitude for policy
simulation before running into out-of-sample
problems. Our work extends theirs in that we are
also able to include information on both private
school costs and a performance-based indicator of
student achievement as explanatory variables. We
also have unusually wide variation in our tuition
variable, which allows us to make inferences about
~he effect of fairly large tuition tax credits with
somewhat more confidence than the narrower ranges
used by other studies. We are thus able to present
additional information on the price elasticity of
private school enrollment and on the likely effect of
tuition tax credits. Our results suggest that a tuition
tax credit would have to be quite large, in the
$2,000 to $3,000 range, before a significant increase
in the proportion of students attending private528 Kee[er and Kriesel School Choice tn Rural Georgia, An Empincul Analysis
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-87 to -3.35
school would be experienced. In addition, we
examine the effect of racial composition on school
choice at the local level in a different regional
context (Georgia versus the Northeast) and find that
the results are quite different.
Determinants of School Choice
There are three important issues involved
in specifying a model of school choice. The first is
to choose a theoretical framework for explaining
individual choice. The second is to link the
theoretical framework for individual choice to the
empirical specification appropriate for the degree of
aggregation of the best available data. The third is
to select the explanatory variables which capture the
most important influences on that choice, We deal
with these issues in turn.
Economic analysis of educational choice
has been based on a model of utility maximization
based on rational choice. The utility of the ith
household if private education (subscripted by v) is
selected is given by U,v(qv, c,, 6,) where q, is a
vector consisting of school characteristics, Cv is a
composite of all other goods consumed, and c, is
an error term. The utility associated with public
education (subscripted by p) for the ith household is
given by U,P(qP, cP, 8P). Parents evaluate whether
the characteristics associated with private education
(q, and c,) provide higher utility than the relevant
public school alternative. The probability of any
individual attending a particular educational
alternative (say, a private school) is the expected
value of a random variable P, which takes on the
value 1 if U,V> U,P and O if U,v < U,P Because of
the presence of the error term, U,v and U,P are
random variables. The dependent variable in our
study is the proportion of children for whom the
choice of private school attendance is made; this is
given by n, = (XPv,)/NJ, where N is the number of
school age children and the subscript j denotes the
school district. This random utility specification has
been found to be generally appropriate for
explaining individual school choice decisions
(Lankford and Wyckofl).
As noted above, Frey (1991) argues that
the supply side of private education must be
modeled to avoid bias in the estimates of demand asJ. Agr. and Applied Econ., December, 1994 529
a function of tuition. We concur, but like many
other researchers have not been able to develop
adequate data to allow systems estimation. We
follow the lead ofother researchers (Hamilton and
Macauley; Lankford and Wyckoffi West and
Palsson) in modeling only the demand side of
educational choice, implicitly assuming a perfectly
elastic supply of private school places. Thus our
study estimates the effect of tuition and other
explanatory variables on parental demand for private
education and not on the actual effect of tuition
changes or tuition tax credits. To the extent that
supply is not perfectly elastic, these demand
estimates overstate the effect of tuition changes on
private school enrollment.
A serious problem with our study, as well
as the great majority of other research on this topic,
is the problem of using aggregated data to model
the effects of policy variables on individual choices.
Our study is framed at the level of the school
district, which captures more sample variation than
studies utilizing statewide data (Frey; West and
Palsson) but still does not reflect the actual unit of
choice - the individual family. The most serious
drawback is the lost variation in the sample; for
example, average income levels will do an imperfect
job of measuring how individual household incomes
affect individual school choices at different points
on the range of household incomes in the sample.
Additionally, at an aggregate level there is a
simultaneity between school choice and quality that
is not present at the individual level (Lankford and
Wyckoff). This arises from the effect on school
quality of the aggregate choice of public versus
private education - more students from families with
parents who are politically influential and/or active
in the public schools can be expected to improve
school quality. More students from these
households choosing private schools can be
expected to decrease school quality. While
family-level data would indeed be desirable, we feel
that the district-level analysis employed here, like
that of Hamilton and Macauiey, provides enough
disaggregation to give a good indication of the
determinants of school choice.
Selection of the variables in q, the vector
of school attributes, depends on the context of the
study and the available data. School quality is
obviously an important characteristic - higher
quality public schools or lower quality private
schools can be expected to decrease P,. In this
study we restrict ourselves to the former because of
data limitations. As noted by Monk, there is no
single best measure of school quality. One measure
is students’ test scores; the hypothesis is that better
scores reflect higher school quality. Test scores can
also reflect a student’s household characteristics and
other influences as well as school quality;
nonetheless it remains a favored explanatory
variable of educational researchers.3 The school
district’s average score for the tenth-grade criterion
reference test of reading ability is used to measure
the educational quality of public schools. We
expect that higher test scores will make public
schools more attractive and thus decrease private
school enrollment.
Expenditure on education has also been
used as a proxy for school quality; the hypothesis is
that higher expenditures result in better education.
Although Monk has pointed out the difficulties of
equating expenditure with quality, many studies
have used expenditure measures. Therefore, we use
the school district’s total per-pupil expenditures.
The student/teacher ratio is another commonly
accepted indicator of quality; lower ratios might be
expected to indicate more individual attention and
thus better education. The data for these three
public school district variables were for 1990 and
were obtained from the Georgia Department of
Education.
Another characteristic we examine is the
percentage of African-American school age
population by school district. [n much of the South,
including rural areas, private education boomed in
the 1960’s as the integration of public schools
mandated by Brown versus Topeka Board of
Education was implemented. We include the racial
composition variable to investigate the effects of
racial composition on school choice.
The variables which indirectly determine
the household’s non-public education consumption
are family income and the cost of private education.
Higher levels of income can be expected to increase
the probability of sending a child to private school,
while higher private school tuition charges should
decrease that probability. Since the financing of
public education is separate from individual choices
to send children to public or private schools, the530 Keeler and Kriesel: School Choice in Rural Georgia: An Empiricul Analysls
individual’s marginal cost of sending a child to
public school is zero.
The Data
The unit of observation is the school
district. In 1990, Georgia had 159 county school
systems and 27 independent city school systems.
Since most of the variables are measured at the
county rather than the city level, it was necessary to
delete from the observation set those counties that
had coexisting county and city school systems.
Deleting these observations left a total of 136
counties that had a single public school system, and
in these counties the school district boundaries
coincide perfectly with the county boundaries. Of
these counties, 105 met the U.S. Census definition
of a nonmetropolitan county; these observations
form the basis of our analysis.
All data except private school tuition and
the three school quality measures previously noted
are from the 1990 Census. The dependent variable
is the ratio of children residing in a school district
that attend any private school to the total number of
children attending any school. The income variable
is per capita income in the school district; the racial
composition variable is the total percentage of
African-Americans in the school-age population in
the school district.
Data on the tuition charged by private
schools were obtained by a telephone survey. The
basis for the survey was a compilation of the state’s
454 private schools by the Georgia Department of
Education. The compilation lists each private
school’s enrollment and the grades taught, and it
contains the full range of private schools, from high
schools with over 1,000 students to church-based
elementary schools with five pupils. Tuition at a
private school is lowest for first graders and most
expensive for high schoolers.
Typically, a county would have one large
private school teaching all grades, and several small
elementary schools affiliated with churches,
Information on boarding schools (of which there are
only seven in Georgia) was not used. Schools
offering only primary education were much smaller
and represented a low proportion of our sample’s
private school enrolment, 31.5 percent. The
combination of this small percentage and the
expense and difficulty of gathering data from these
establishments led to our omitting these schools’
data from the construction of our tuition variable.
Some counties had no private high school but had
one or more private elementary schools, and these
were usually church- supported, In these cases the
tuition from the elementary schools was not used,
but rather the high school tuition from a
neighboring county.4 For these reasons we believe
that high school tuition is the best indicator
available to us of the private school price for most
parents considering private schools for their
children.
A weighted average of tuition was
calculated for the counties with two or more private
high schools. Counties that had no private school
were assigned the tuition of its lowest-tuition
neighboring county, plus the annual transportation
costs (assumed to be by automobile) from the center
of that county to border of the neighboring county.
Transportation mileage was calculated as the
distance, measured on a road map, times two times
180 school days. Transportation costs were
calculated by the annual travel milage times the per
mile travel cost, which will depend on an array of
factors including fuel costs, vehicle value and the
opportunity cost of travel time. Travel costs of
$0.35 per mile were selected primarily because it
seemed a reasonable figure. Alternative travel costs
of $0.25 and $0.45 were pretested in the empirical
model but they did not affect the tuition variable’s
performance substantially. As noted above, the
travel costs were added to the annual private school
tuition. Thus regions of the state that have no
private schools will reflect that absence by having
relatively higher private tuition costs.
Estimation and Results
Our dependent variable is a proportion, and
each observation actually represents the sum of
individual choices by underlying populations of
varying size. OLS estimates will therefore suffer
horn problems of heteroskedasticity, and will be
inefficient (although unbiased). We chose to use
weighted least squares estimates corrected for
heteroskedasticity. This approach is appropriate for
our data and performs as well as any available
alternatives. In addition, it presents no problem for
observations close to zero (Greene). The dependent
variable is the log odds of private school attendanceJ. Agr, and Applied Econ,, December, 1994 531
k [n, / (I - rc,)], where rc, is the aforementioned to zero. They find that such a policy would double
proportion of children in private school. The enrollments in their sample from 12 percent to 25
weights are provided by a consistent estimator of percent. We choose to examine the effect of more
variance of the heteroskedastic errors: modest public subsidies to private education as
being more likely to approximate any actual policy
S2=N, rcj(l -n,)”’.
J (1) relevant to rural Georgia in the foreseeable future.
The estimated equation takes the form:
s,-’ ln[7cJ/ (1 - rc,)] =
SJ-’a + p (s,-’ x,)+u,. (2)
We were particularly interested in the
effect of the tuition variable, and expected that It
might be nonlinear. In particular, we hypothesized
that tuition differences would matter more at low
tuition levels but would have less effect at very high
tuition levels as the odds of attending private school
became very low. To test this, we examined a
scatter diagram of proportion of private school
attendance and tuition and found a curvilinear,
inverse relationship. Therefore, we used a squared
tuition term to provide more flexibility for the
model. The model performed well (table 2), with
significance at the 0.05 level for the variables of the
most interest to our study. Only the input measures
of school quality-teacher-student ratio and
per-student expenditure - were not significant at the
0.05 level, although the latter was at the 0.10
levels
We first turn to a comparison of the price
elasticities for private education. For this study, as
well as the previous ones, interpreting an elasticity
is awkward because the dependent variable is the
log of a proportion and a quadratic term is included.
We therefore utilized a standard numerical
approximation for the point elasticity:
[[f(P+h)-f(P)]/h] / [f(P)/P], where h is a small
increment in tuition, $1, and P is the average
tuition. Applying this approximation leads to a
price elasticity of- 1,07. This is on the lower end of
the elasticities found by other researchers (see table
1).
Of these existing studies, only Lankford
and Wyckoff use the estimated model to simulate
the effects of public interventions which change the
effective price of private education. They present
an experiment which predicts the change in private
school enrollment if tuition were effectively reduced
We use the estimated parameters of
Equation 2 to simulate the effect of vouchers or tax
credits for private education. If people view these
policies as a dollar-for-dollar private school tuition
reduction, then we can project a credit’s effect by
substituting a new tuition value reflecting the
subsidy and then calculating the resulting ~. The
average private school tuition in our sample is
$3605 per year. A $500 tuition tax credit (or
voucher) would increase the demand for private
school education by 0.61 percent of the total student
population. This represents a small decrease in
public school attendance - about 16 students in the
average rural Georgia county - but a fairly
significant increase in enrollment for private school
given the relatively low current enrollment
percentages.
A $1,000 credit would cause demand for
private education to rise by 1.32 percent of the total
enrollment, but would represent a 35 percent
increase in the demand for private school places. A
$2,000 credit would increase demand by 3.1 percent
of the total student population; this would increase
private school demand by more than half and cause
a noticeable though not significant reduction in
public school attendance if the supply of private
school places were elastic enough to absorb these
students without significant tuition increases. A
$2,600 voucher - the amount contained in
California’s Proposition 174, which was narrowly
defeated in November, 1993 - would increase
private school enrollment by 4.4 percent of the total
student population and more than double demand
for private school places in the average Georg~a
rural school district,
The effect of per capita income is as
expected (and the coefficient is significantly
different from zero); wealthier populations send a
higher percentage of students to private schools.
Our proxy for student achievement in the public
schools was also significant and negative: higher
test scores apparently result in higher public
enrollment (although there is the possibility of some532 Keeler and Kriesel: School Choice in Rural Georgia: An Empirical Analysis
Table 2, A Weighted Least Squares with Heteroskedasticity Correction Model of the Demand for
Private Education, Georgia School Districts, 1990. (dependent variable: log odds of private school
attendance in a school district)
Variable Mean’ Range’ Coefficient
(std. dev,) (std. err.)
Tuition, Adjusted for Travel Costs 3605 1445-12608 -0.0003
(2099) (00001)”
Square Tuition 2.22 E-OS
(7.48 E-09)*
Per Capita Income 0,0002
(0.000I)*
Per Cent African-American 00290
Population (0.0043)*
Standardized Test Score -0.0269
(o 0077)”






Number of Observations 105
Adjusted R-squared 0.978
s These descriptive statistics are for the untransformed independent variables. The regression
coefficients refer to the transformed variables as defined in equation (2).
* indicates rejection of the one-tailed hypothesis test at the O05 significance level
















simultaneity here if students with higher demand for
education are most likely to leave public schools),
The coefficient for the school expenditure variable
was positive and significant at the 10 percent level.
It is surprising that higher public school
expenditures seem to be associated with higher
private school enrollments, but this result was also
reported by Lankford and Wyckoff. They offer the
explanation that school quality is better explained by
test scores and student-teacher ratios, and
expenditures mainly reflect cost differences,
Another explanation is that additional private school
attendance increases public school per-pupil
expenditure ceteris paribus because funding drops
proportionally less than enrollment. The coefficient
for student-teacher ratio was not significant; this
could well be a result of high degrees of collinearity
with the two variables discussed above. Overall,
the evidence of our model supports the view that
higher quality public schools decrease the likelihood
of any given student’s enrollment in a private
school.
The coefficient on the racial composition
variable is positive and significant at the 5 percent
level; higher percentages of African-American
students in the school age population are associated
with higher private school enrollments, At the
mean the point elasticity is 3,76; these changes
appear to be fairly large. It is certainly possible that
this variable is picking up perceived quality or
income effects not captured by the variables we
used to measure these factors. However, overall we
believe that this result supports the view that the
decision to attend private school in rural Georgia is
still partially explained by segregationist
preferences.J Agr, and Applied Econ,, December, 1994
Summary and Conclusions
We present a model of school choice in
rural Georgia. The model performs well and
indicates that private school enrollment is influenced
by private school tuition, but not to the extent found
in studies in other parts of the country. Our results
indicate that tuition tax credits or voucher policies
which significantly lower the cost of private
education in Georgia will have a significant effect
on the demand for private education but a relatively
small effect on public school enrollments. A
primary result will be a subsidy to parents who are
already sending their children to private schools.
The results indicate that rural public
education administrators can potentially influence
parents’ decisions to remove their children from
public schools. We find that school quality, as
measured by achievement test scores and
teacher/student ratios, does significantly influence
school choice. Higher quality public schools are
associated with lower percentages of children
attending private school. Thus, administrators who
achieve higher quality education in their classrooms
can expect to be rewarded with fewer students
leaving the public schools,
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Endnotes
1. Early proposals included a $250-$500 credit considered by the U.S. Senate in 1981 (Frey 1983).
Proposals for tax credits from $1,000 to $2,600 have been made or considered at a national level (Wall
Street Journal), at the state level by voter initiative in California (Banks) and by legislative proposal in
Colorado (Bingham) and Maryland (Leff). Local experiments with vouchers include Milwaukee (Asimov),
Jersey City (Anderson and Binstein), and Denver (Bingham).
2. Another empirical study (Darling-Hammond, et al.) has examined the effect of tuition tax deductions.
3. Fox notes (p. 281) “Achievement test scores are the output quality proxy generally used.”
4. Comparing private school enrollments for these small primary schools with census data on private school
enrollment for county residents indicated that the substantial majority of students in these counties were
attending schools in other counties.
5. The adjusted R2 for this model was 0.98, but the R* is a poor indicator of model performance for this
model (Greene).